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Victimhood to Agency:
A Constructionist Comparison of
Sexual Orientation to Religious Orientation
Carmen M. Butler1
Introduction
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”2 Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s words bear a timeless truth to the extent that he spoke
about our nation’s aspirations for “justice for all.” But when Coretta Scott
King expounded on Dr. King’s words, she took the notion of “justice for
all” to a new level. Specifically, she tied the notion of civil rights for
African Americans to other groups in American society when she said,
“Freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation is surely a
fundamental human right in any great democracy, as much as freedom from
racial, religious, gender, or ethnic discrimination.”3
Some gay4 rights advocates have seized upon Ms. King’s characterization
of the struggle for human rights to advocate specifically for gay rights. But
in so doing, have they chosen a less advantageous comparison of rights?5 In
this essay, I argue that when gay rights advocates base their advocacy on a
comparison of gay rights to civil rights for African Americans, the
essentialist nature of their comparison is detrimental.
An essentialist
comparison is detrimental because it limits the dynamics of sexuality to the
perceived dynamics of race–a fixed, unalterable status. It forces gays to
pair their demands for equality with victimizing assertions that “I was born
this way and I can’t help it.” Whatever the scientific support for this
assertion, it is psychologically demeaning.
Gay rights advocates and gays would improve long-term basic rights6
recognition for and amongst gays if they employed a constructionist
approach.
A constructionist approach focuses less on victimizing
immutable status and more on one’s own agency.7 Constructionist
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arguments that sexuality is an exercise in freedom of conscience would
liberate the gay image from the victimization paradigm inherent in
essentialism,8 cast off unrealistic stereotypes imposed on gays and gay
advocates, and reflect more accurately the dynamic nature of human
sexuality. Under constructionist theory, gay rights advocates can also draw
a more beneficial analogy between sexual orientation and religious
orientation. By focusing on the personal integrity inherent in the freedom
of conscience rather than the helplessness inherent in status, and by acting
as agents rather than victims, constructionist gay rights advocates can obtain
a more meaningful recognition of gay rights.
In this essay, I critique the paradigms that judges, lawyers, and advocates
use when they interpret and apply the law with respect to gay rights. I
begin by examining essentialist and constructionist approaches to gay
rights. In Part I, I define essentialism and constructionism and measure
their potential impact on the gay rights movement. In Part II, I compare the
application of each theory in litigation. Although essentialists frequently
compare sexual orientation to race, the way they use the comparison might
not advance gay rights. I conclude that gay rights advocates could secure
more meaningful rights recognition with a constructionist theory that
analogizes sexual orientation to religious orientation, an orientation based
on the notion of freedom of conscience. Through asserting freedom of
conscience, gay rights advocates can finally achieve what the gay rights
movement has been missing: a way to unabashedly reclaim basic rights.9

I. ESSENTIALISM V. CONSTRUCTIONISM
A. A Tale of Two Theories
In recent decades, gay rights advocates have commonly used essentialist
theory as a platform for promoting gay rights. According to essentialists,
being gay is a biological fact.10 “Gays can’t help it,” the argument goes,
“they [or we] were born this way.”11 In contrast to essentialists,
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constructionists believe that being gay is part of the identity a person
develops in the course of her lifetime, not simply at birth.
The contrast between essentialism and constructionism raises the
question: if being “born this way” is a category that boxes gays into a static,
immutable category, why would gay rights advocates choose to employ it?
The primary reason these advocates rely on essentialist theory is to obtain
status and rights as a suspect class that warrants constitutional and statutory
protection.12 A renowned gay rights theorist, Joe Sartelle, explains that gay
essentialists have a “profound collective wish . . . for ‘proof’ that our
sexuality is forced upon us, that [our sexuality] . . . does not involve free
choice and free will.”13 By arguing that sexuality is an imposition and not a
choice, gay essentialists create a “biological destiny” that is easier for
politicians, family, and friends to accept.14 Essentialist advocates point to
“gay brain studies,” studies that posit that gays have unique brain
structures.15 Still, the essentialist approach, as it is currently expounded,
has proved counterproductive as a vehicle for securing gay rights for three
reasons.
First, when an essentialist gay person claims that she cannot help her
condition, she basically claims that she16 is helpless, a victim in her own
skin.17 In so doing, she unwittingly marginalizes gays as a minority
identity.18 She inadvertently invites others to conclude that her own and
others’ minority sexual orientation is a condition that might one day be
scientifically cured or otherwise eliminated. Worst of all, she loses the
opportunity to foster a more accurate understanding of what it means to be
gay, lesbian, or queer.19 Meanwhile, the political and social gains she can
make for gays are limited to those she can obtain on the basis of supposed
victim status.
Second, the essentialist advocate fails to capture reality. He fails to
recognize the societal influences that shape a person’s own perceptions of
sexuality over time.20 Essentialist theory instead offers “a false premise that
if you are something, that’s all you are” and that is all you will ever be.21
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Our essentialist advocate cannot explain, for example, how Anne Heche
could fall in love with Ellen Degeneres when she was not “born a
lesbian.”22 She is equally at a loss to explain why Ani Di Franco, a bisexual
and feminist singer who gained fame among lesbians, took a man to be her
partner.
Third, the essentialist advocate tends to promote stereotypes.
Specifically, she tends to support what Sartelle calls the “heterosexual
alibi.”23 The heterosexual alibi is the belief that a gay person can be easily
identified by her non-sexual behavior. For example, the heterosexual alibi
supports the misconception that just because a woman is a feminist, she
must be a lesbian.24 It also supports the assumption that just because a man
played college football, he could not possibly be gay because, according to
the heterosexual alibi, gay men are not likely to be good football players.25
Based on this tendency to stereotype, essentialists struggle to explain Rock
Hudson, a movie star no one would have guessed could be gay because he
was just what a man is “supposed to be”—masculine and popular with
women. In this way, essentialists—intentionally or otherwise—link a
person’s sexuality to a number of other assumptions about that person’s
preferences in other realms of life.26
In contrast to essentialists, constructionists assume that sexuality is a
social fact about a person.27 Constructionists describe a “social fact” as a
matter of conscience—an exercise of free will—rather than an immutable
condition. While constructionists do not entirely rule out the possibility that
some people are born gay or that there might be something innate about
sexuality, they allow people to first define themselves as they are, rather
than acquiescing to definitions of sexuality imposed by a heterosexual
standard.28
As a legal tool, there are at least three ways constructionist theory
overcomes barriers inherent in essentialist theory.
First, because
constructionists believe that sexuality is an exercise of conscience and an
affirmation of human freedom,29 they are able to vanquish the stifling image
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that gays are somehow their own victims. Constructionist advocates
capture the exercise of free will and personal autonomy that is inherent in
acting on one’s sexual attractions. They turn the essentialist mantra, “I’m
attracted to a person of the same sex and I can’t help it,” into an affirmative
statement: “I’m attracted to a person of the same sex and, in today’s
society, there is no reason I can’t show my true feelings.”
Second, constructionist advocates capture reality in a way that essentialist
advocates cannot by recognizing the range of choices a person may
willfully exercise as a result of her sexual orientation. A well-known survey
of sexual desires and attractions, the Kinsey study, details a variety of ways
that people express their sexual attractions.30 The study makes a blur of the
simplistic distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals by revealing
that most behavior cannot be plotted on a graph as belonging strictly to one
group or another.31 This spectrum can only be captured by constructionist
theory.
Finally, constructionist advocates can help liberate gays from confusing
stereotypes. Instead of following the “heterosexual alibi,” constructionist
advocates perceive each individual according to his own personal choices.
They accept the fluid nature of human sexuality32 and recognize that there is
no universal “gay experience” that accompanies a gay sexual orientation.33
I do not propose that constructionist theory is the answer to the gay rights
movement; rather, I suggest that constructionist theory provides an answer
to the troubling limitations of essentialist theory as it is currently
expounded. Through dialogue, constructionist advocates address the ways
that people discriminate against gays34 and can create grounds by which
gays can more meaningfully reclaim their autonomy. The ways that people
discriminate against gays include establishing heterosexuality as the
standard by which all people must live35 and the harsh underlying
heterosexist accusation that gays are immoral.36 The constructionist
addresses this discrimination not by way of apology, as an essentialist
might, but by asserting personal autonomy, conscience, and choice. More
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specifically, constructionist gay advocates engage opponents’ concerns by
asking when it is appropriate for society to restrain freedom of choice, and
if it is ever appropriate to impinge on a person’s freedom of conscience.37
By engaging lawmakers and judges in the search for answers to these
questions, constructionist advocates shift the focus away from protecting a
victimized and victimizing class and toward honoring the dignity and
autonomy inherent in following their own conscience. In other words,
constructionist advocates direct the gay rights movement away from
victimhood and towards agency.
B. Hypothetical Conversations between Gay Rights Proponents and
Opponents
A simplified set of hypothetical arguments might help to frame the issue
more clearly. These hypothetical debates demonstrate the contours of
essentialist and constructionist theory and underscore the strengths and
weaknesses of each theory.
The first conversation is between two essentialist theorists, one who
opposes, and another who supports, gay rights. Note in this conversation
how each essentialist theorist emphasizes the immutable characteristics and
“status” of being gay.
Essentialist proponent: “I’m gay. It’s a condition that I can’t
change. I’m part of a class analogous to African Americans,
whose movement for civil rights developed into recognition of
rights that no one would openly deny them today. It is time for
recognition of my rights, too.”
Essentialist opponent: [Reluctantly] “That’s a pity that you can’t
change what you are. My son is also gay, and it pains me terribly
to see him suffer. I have resisted any recognition of rights until
now, but I see you people just can’t help it. Your rights should be
recognized.”
This conversation demonstrates that even if consensus is reached, the
consensus is likely to be based on pity and victimhood. The essentialist
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proponent of gay rights requests that the essentialist opponent recognize his
rights because he cannot help being gay and is therefore a victim. Notice
that the essentialist opponent concedes, but only because she feels pity.
Note also that the essentialist proponent is himself gay. A heterosexual
would not be as convincing in making the same argument unless he were
arguing the more generalized notion of “justice for all.” This suggests that
perspective matters. This is in part because the gay advocate for gay rights
can evoke more pity by expressing contrition. His message is essentially
this: “I’m gay. I can’t help it. (I’m sorry.)”
The essentialist proponent also compares his own struggle for rights to
the civil rights movement, a movement the essentialist gay rights advocate
assumes is based on essentialism. Many white gay advocates assume that
African Americans assert their civil rights on the basis of skin color: “I
can’t help being black. I was born this way.” But that assumption is
incorrect.38 Rather, leaders of the civil rights movement simply demanded
and continue to demand that African Americans be given the chance to
make the same contributions and receive similar treatment as white
Americans.39 They seek to be judged not by the color of their skin, but by
their personal merit.40 Their argument for civil rights is not essentialist, but
purposely constructionist.41 Just as the movement for rights for African
Americans is based on merit, the movement for gay rights must also be
structured on a merit-seeking theory. Constructionist theory based on
inviolable freedom of conscience is the more appropriate theory for
accomplishing that goal.
The second hypothetical conversation features the same essentialist
proponent of gay rights and a constructionist theorist who opposes gay
rights.
Essentialist proponent: “Being gay isn’t something I can change.
Like African Americans, who have struggled for and won
recognition for their basic rights, my gay brothers and sisters and I
have struggled. It is time that our rights are recognized.”
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Constructionist opponent: “Whether or not you can change
being gay, it’s okay to be African American, but it’s not okay to be
gay. Just because you have a desire doesn’t mean you have to act
on it.”
This conversation reveals further limitations in essentialist theory. The
constructionist opponent of gay rights cleverly unveils the essentialist
argument to show that there is some volition involved in sexuality. If there
is any “condition” central to being gay, the constructionist says, that
condition is not the end of the story. A person can still fake happiness by
pretending to be heterosexual. For example, a person can be gay but remain
celibate so that no one has to know that he is gay. Or, the same person can
be gay but force himself to be intimate only with opposite sex partners in
order to appease the majority non-gay society.42 The implicit message from
the constructionist opponent of gay rights is the following: gay people must
mold themselves to fit heterosexual behavioral norms, whether or not those
norms are compatible with their innermost conscience.
Gay rights advocates might find a solution to this dilemma when they
employ constructionist theory to defend gay rights and to engage gay rights
opponents in a more meaningful dialogue. For an example of how this
dialogue works, consider a third conversation between the same
constructionist theorist who opposed gay rights in the last conversation and
a new constructionist theorist who supports gay rights. In this conversation,
note that the theorists focus their exchange on choice and conduct, rather
than on immutable characteristics and status.
Constructionist proponent: “It’s my choice to share intimate
touch and feelings. Who are you to insist that I can’t decide for
myself who my partner will be?”
Constructionist opponent: “Sure, you have choices in life. But
it’s immoral to act on them to engage in intimacy with members of
the same sex. It’s simply not right.”
Constructionist proponent: “Your denial of my ability to make a
very personal choice would restrict my free exercise of autonomy
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and conscience. Whether you choose to reflect on my actions as
such, I know that my decisions reflect a clear conscience and sense
of personal dignity. No outside imposition of morality can change
the intrinsic values or the clear conscience I possess.”
The theorists in this conversation start by addressing personal integrity,
or agency,43 and advance to address notions of societal morality and the
inviolability of a person’s dignity. Their conversation is an example of a
genuine exchange that moves beyond pleas for pity and sympathy into a
dialogue where value systems are compared and contrasted. In this
example, the constructionist proponent of gay rights takes responsibility for
his own actions. Furthermore, he does so without revealing whether his
choices and actions reflect a gay sexuality. In this example, sexuality is not
at issue, freedom of conscience is.
In sum, constructionist theory offers a more meaningful approach to gay
rights than essentialist theory for two reasons. First, constructionist theory
is more liberating because it gives gay rights advocates a more empowering
way to reclaim gay rights. Instead of making a plea for rights based on
immutable characteristics, constructionist gay rights advocates reclaim an
inherent right to exercise one’s conscience. Second, constructionist theory
is more realistic because it acknowledges that human sexuality is dynamic
rather than static, and that one’s choices with respect to intimacy are not
conclusively determined at birth or by personal decisions throughout life.
Through its liberating and realistic approach, constructionist theory avoids
perpetuating stereotypes that establish unrealistic expectations for gay
people. At the same time, it offers a more meaningful basis for gay rights
advocates to engage opponents in a dialogue about the value of personal
integrity in American society today.
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II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, RACE, AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
A. The Old Analog: Comparing Sexual Orientation to Race
Case law can help demonstrate the underlying theories that shape
litigation and the law concerning gay rights. Although judges do not
usually explicitly analogize racism to homophobia, they do make
assumptions regarding the parties in court from which we can infer either an
essentialist or constructionist posture. Based on that inference, we can
make an educated guess as to which analogy might support the judges’
conclusions.
In the following two case examples, I consider the court’s implicit
assumptions, infer whether the court employed an essentialist or
constructionist paradigm, determine what analogy the court might have
used to balance the parties’ relative rights, and review the courts’ final
holdings. The results of this analysis suggest that essentialist theory does
not, for the most part, help advance gay rights, and that constructionist
theory coupled with a new analog would strengthen the gay rights
movement.
First, the case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y. demonstrates how a court’s
essentialist perception of gay families is detrimental.44 In this case, the
court issued an order of filiation, a judicial determination of paternity, to
force an already complete family to accept a sperm donor as a third parent.
The court issued the order supporting the sperm donor even though,
according to a mutual agreement between him and the two mothers, he
never financially supported his biological daughter, and he did not call to
inquire about the child for the first three years of her life.45 Although the
majority opinion does not explicitly state that it employed essentialism to
fashion its conclusions, we can look to certain passages in the opinion to
deconstruct its essentialist leanings.
The issue in Thomas S. was whether a sperm donor who is known to his
daughter is entitled to a judicial determination of paternity.46 In this case
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Ry, a twelve-year-old girl, lived with her biological mother, Robin, and her
mother’s lifetime companion, Sandra.47 Robin conceived Ry by artificial
insemination using the semen of Thomas, who was gay and a known sperm
donor in San Francisco.48 Ry was the second girl in the family after Cade,
who was born to Sandra by artificial insemination two years before by a
different sperm donor.49 The family lived in New York, where Thomas
visited only occasionally during business trips.50 In accordance with an oral
agreement between Robin and Thomas, Thomas did not support Ry
financially or call her during the first three years of Ry’s life.51
When Cade, then age five, started asking questions about her own sperm
donor, Robin and Sandra made arrangements for Ry and Cade to meet their
biological fathers in the presence of their mothers.52 Over the following
six-year period, Thomas met with Robin and Sandra’s family for
approximately twenty-six visits.53 Then, when Ry was eight years old,
Thomas told Robin and Sandra that he would like to establish a parental
relationship with Ry. Robin and Sandra regarded this as a breach of their
agreement.54 After Thomas initiated litigation, Ry expressed a desire to end
all contact with her biological father.55
Although the family court refused to enter an order of filiation in the
case, characterizing Thomas as an “outsider attacking [Ry’s] family [and]
refusing to give it respect,”56 a majority of the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, found that Thomas had developed a sufficient relationship with
Ry. It reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case with
instructions to recognize Thomas as Ry’s father.57 Throughout the opinion,
the majority implies that there is but one formula for parenting—a father
and a mother—and it must be upheld regardless of how the family
developed before litigation. Implicit in the opinion is the essentialist notion
that a lesbian woman can never complete a family by being the second
parent. In four different parts of its opinion, the majority drives home its
vision of what a family ought to be.
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First, the majority starts by championing Thomas as deserving a greater
status than that of a mere biological father or sperm donor. The majority
seems to equate Thomas’ sperm donation with parental status, regardless of
whether Thomas has acted in a parent-like fashion and regardless of
whether the family already considers itself a complete unit:
[T]he effect of the Family Court’s order is to cut off the parental rights of
a man who is conceded by all concerned . . . to be the biological father. The
legal question is not . . . whether an established family unit is to be broken
up. . . . Rather [it is] whether the rights of a biological parent are to be
terminated.58
Second, even though Thomas’ only connection to the family is his sperm
donation and two dozen visits with the family as a whole, the court
compares the biological and actual mother, Robin, and the sperm
donor/biological father, Thomas, to a divorced couple: “No one would
suggest that, in the typical case of divorce and remarriage of a mother, a
father’s parental rights should thereupon be subject to termination because
his intimate involvement in the child’s upbringing is no longer feasible or
welcome.”59
The inherently essentialist and heterosexist nature of the majority’s
comparison can be fleshed out if we consider how the majority would opine
using the same formula, but different facts. Consider, for example, how the
court would likely react to a request for an order of filiation if Robin and
Sandra were Rob and Sandra, and if Thomas were Tomasina, the surrogate
mother. In that case, the court would probably find, using its essentialist
filter, that Tomasina had no parental rights to see Ry whenever she pleased
without Rob and Sandra present. Rob, Sandra, Ry, and Cade would be a
complete family, not by virtue of their conduct, but by virtue of their
acceptable heterosexual status in the eyes of the court.60 By altering the
facts, we see more clearly that the court in this case forces an image based
on a heterosexist and patriarchal essentialism.
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Third, the majority reconstructs Robin and Sandra’s family and the roles
of each litigant according to an essentialist formula: “The notion that a
lesbian mother should enjoy a parental relationship with her daughter but a
gay father should not is so innately discriminatory as to be unworthy of
comment.”61
The court asserts that if Robin, the biological mother, can have a parental
relationship with Ry, so should Thomas, the biological father. Notice,
though, that in this part of the opinion, the majority subtly discards the
“biological” label in order to refashion Thomas as the “father.” This role
reconstruction helps put Thomas on par with Ry’s mothers, Robin and
Sandra. The majority’s implicit message is that a family run by two
mothers is unacceptable. The court must introduce a real father—not just a
biological father or sperm donor—to make the family whole.
Fourth, the majority cites the New York Domestic Relations statute to
drive home its heteropatriarchical62 point: “A child born out of wedlock
will only be rendered legitimate by the subsequent marriage of the mother
and a man admitting paternity or judicially declared to be the father.”63 By
mentioning the concepts of “wedlock” and of “a mother and a man,” the
majority again suggests that both the child and the family in which the child
is born can only approach legitimacy if the court declares the petitioner
sperm donor to be Ry’s father.
In contrast to the essentialist paradigm employed by the majority, the
dissent’s opening demonstrates a constructionist understanding of the
family: “The complexity of human relationships that permeate this case and
the contemporary reality of millions of households that maintain alternative
family life styles strongly militate against the rigid, abstract application of
legal principles, not designed for situations such as this . . . .”64
After examining Thomas’ contact with Ry and considering what was best
for her given her family structure, the dissent concluded that Thomas had no
protected parental rights as a result of his failure for nearly ten years to
assume the responsibilities of parenthood.65
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The majority opinion in Thomas S., demonstrates all of the pitfalls of
essentialist theory. First, essentialism supports the view that one’s sexuality
is a fixed condition. To that condition, judges and lawyers are apt to affix a
preset status. In the case of Thomas S., the majority affixed to the condition
of the two lesbian mothers the status of incomplete parenthood. In contrast,
the dissent’s constructionist argument challenged the majority to focus not
on the status of the lesbian mothers and the gay sperm donor, but on their
conduct as parents. By focusing on Robin and Sandra’s conduct as parents,
the dissent recognized that Robin and Sandra’s parenthood was complete
and that, in contrast, Thomas was more aptly described as an “outsider.”66
Second, essentialism is destructive in this instance because it fails to
capture reality and fails, more specifically, to recognize the significance of
social influences.67 The essentialist majority in this case operates according
to a binary structure, whereby a family is not coded as complete until it
features a man, a woman, and children. In other words, the majority
perceived Robin and Sandra’s parenting as one half of a heterosexual
equation which can only be completed by the biological father, Thomas.
The majority does not show signs of engaging in a constructionist dialogue
to inquire whether this family is complete given the way Ry relates to her
mothers and the way they relate to Ry. Nor does the majority seem
concerned with Thomas’ meager connection to Ry or his lack of father-like
conduct.68
Third, essentialism tends to promote stereotypes. The court implies that
there are clear differences between same-sex parents and opposite-sex
parents. It implies that only opposite-sex parents are legitimate, even
though this view is not supported by any definitive studies.69 Thus, when
the majority concluded that it must issue an order of paternity for Thomas,
it relied on its own stereotype of what makes a complete family.
The case of Thomas S. aside, there is merit to the argument that
essentialism does not always harm gay individuals, couples, or families. In
fact, Romer v. Evans is one case in which the Supreme Court employed an
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essentialist paradigm to maintain basic rights for gays.70 However, the
statute in question was an unprecedented attack on gays’ basic access to
political processes. The court itself characterized the attack as “rare.”71
At issue in Romer v. Evans was the Colorado constitutional amendment
that barred all legislative, executive, or judicial action to protect gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals.72 Amendment 2, adopted in a 1992 statewide
referendum, was an antagonistic reaction to several municipal ordinances
that had banned discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in
housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services.73 Specifically, the amendment read as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle
any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects selfexecuting.74
The Supreme Court examined the statute using an essentialist filter that
stressed the status and inherent traits attributed to gays. In particular, it
emphasized the apparent discriminatory purpose of Amendment 2 against
“persons by a single trait.”75 The court further acknowledged the “statusbased” nature of the act,76 and held that “[c]entral to our own Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of
its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”77
By focusing on the essentialist status and traits of homosexuality and
bisexuality under Amendment 2, the court found Colorado’s law to be
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.78 While the victory in this case protected gays from an
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encroachment on their most basic civil right to access political processes, it
was not a victory in which new ground was gained.79
Thomas S., Romer, and their progeny suggest that essentialism, as it is
currently expounded, is too limiting to meaningfully advance gay rights.
While essentialism may help maintain rights in “rare” cases, the theory is
less likely to help advance gay rights. Meanwhile, gays face continuing
violence, and discrimination in housing, public accommodations,
employment, health benefits, adoption, child custody, child visitation, civil
marriage, family-based immigration, and inheritance. A new approach is
needed.80
B. Call for a New Analog: Comparing Sexual Orientation to Religious
Orientation
The gay rights movement would benefit from a new analog that aligns
the movement more easily with constructionist theory, a theory that
emphasizes the autonomy inherent in being gay. A more useful analog for
the gay rights movement is to compare sexual orientation to religious
orientation. Ultimately, this analog can help link the familiar premise of
religious rights to a new premise for gay rights: freedom of conscience.
There are several useful comparisons that advocates can draw from this
new analog.
First, religious orientation, like sexual orientation,
encompasses a conscious belief or series of beliefs to which we may silently
adhere or which we may share with a community. Neither a religious
minority nor a sexual minority may be singled out from a crowd of people
under most circumstances; the individual’s status is often only known when
she manifests her conscience. Second, the religious or sexual minority
individual may choose to exercise her conscience or refrain from exercising
her conscience, depending on the nature of the community in which she
lives and the extent to which she feels secure reaching out to others of
similar orientation. Third, just as a person’s religious orientation may alter
during her lifetime to more aptly suit her conscience or experience, her
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sexual orientation may also undergo change and adaptation. Fourth, just as
the identity of a religious minority is more accurately described by
constructionist theory, so is the identity of a sexual minority. For example,
the extent to which a person’s religious or sexual orientation is more
accepted or less accepted in a society will depend on the time in which a
person lives, the culture, and most of all, the prevalent social mores. Fifth,
regardless of the societal or familial pressures a person may face with
respect to his religious or sexual orientation, the personal determination of
what is right and wrong ultimately depends on his own conscience.81
There are a number of benefits that gay rights advocates can derive from
analogizing gay rights to religious rights. Constructionist gay rights
advocates can move beyond the essentialist-based recognition that
discrimination exists and into a more dynamic analysis of why there ought
to be equal protection for people who have a minority sexual orientation.
Utilizing the new analogy, gay rights advocates can invite faith-based
groups to join in advancing both minority religious rights and gay rights
through a common appreciation of freedom of conscience.82 Moreover, the
analogy of religious orientation to sexual orientation can help foster a more
positive image among gays who seek a less victimizing approach to
claiming their own rights.
The question of how advocates can analogize homosexuality to religion
is one of unexplored legal strategy, perhaps in part because religious and
gay groups in society are frequently seen as political adversaries.83 A
simple comparison of how courts84 perceive rights based on sexual
orientation versus how courts perceive rights based on religious orientation
demonstrates that courts do not currently view gay litigants with respect to
their freedom of conscience or expression in the same way they view
religious litigants. Niemotko v. Maryland is one case in which the Supreme
Court addressed religious orientation with deference to the group’s freedom
of expression.
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In Niemotko, appellant Nietmotko and a co-appellant were members of a
Jehovah’s Witness religious group.85 When the group submitted a request
to city hall to use the city park for Bible talks, city officials denied them
access.86 In spite of the city’s denial, the group proceeded with their plans
because no statute required the group to secure formal permission.87
However, when Nietmotko opened the meeting in the city park, police
officers immediately arrested him.88 He and his colleague were charged
with disorderly conduct, convicted, and fined.89 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland declined review, but the United States Supreme Court took the
case because it presented substantial constitutional issues.90
In a concise constructionist opinion, the Niemotko court concluded that
the city’s refusal to issue the group a license constituted clear “unwarranted
discrimination.”91 The Court acknowledged that the only questions the city
council asked appellants before denying them access “pertained to their
alleged refusal to salute the flag, their views on the Bible, and other issues
irrelevant to unencumbered use of the public parks.”92 The Court
determined that it was clear from this irrelevant exchange that “the use of
the park was denied because of the city council’s dislike for or
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views.”93 Thus, the Court
concluded that the refusal constituted a violation of the appellants’
constitutional rights to equal protection under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, which have “a firmer foundation than the whims or personal
opinions of a local governing body.”94
The deference the Supreme Court accorded to the appellants in this case
based on their freedom of religion stands in stark contrast to the lack of
deference accorded to the two mothers in the case of Thomas S. There are
at least three ways in which the Thomas S. court’s holding on gay rights
differed from the Niemotko court’s holding on religious freedoms.
First, although the Thomas S. majority claimed to focus on the rights of
the father, to the extent that that focus was based on the majority’s
disagreement with the mothers and their incomplete status as parents, the
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focus amounted to what the Niemotko court would call “unwarranted
discrimination.”95 If the Thomas S. majority had accorded as much
deference to the conduct of the mothers, Robin and Sandra, as the Niemotko
court accorded the conduct of the Witnesses, perhaps the Thomas S. court
would have come to a more constructionist acceptance of the family unit
consisting of two mothers and their children.
Second, the Thomas S. majority insisted on perceiving the litigants as part
of a heteropatriarchical96 world based on status where same-sex parenting is
bad and opposite-sex parenting is good. This binary vision of the litigants’
status is evidenced first by comparing the relationship of the actual mother
and sperm donor to a divorced couple and second, by comparing Ry’s birth
to a birth out of wedlock. In contrast to the status-based essentialist
paradigm the Thomas S. majority employs, the Niemotko court insisted that
the same law apply to the same conduct, regardless of the differences
among those who seek the law’s protection.
Third, the Niemotko court expressly forbade stereotyping when it
declared that constitutional rights will not be regarded or disregarded
according to the “whims or personal opinions of a local governing body.”97
The Thomas S. majority, on the other hand, seemed either unaware that it
applied unproven stereotypes to the same-sex parents in question or
unsympathetic to the consequences of its decision.98 Whatever the case
may be, the majority clearly accorded less deference to the lesbian mothers
in Thomas S. case than the Niemotko court accorded the Witnesses.99
The Thomas S. and Niemotko cases present comparable rights issues.
They suggest that to avoid discrimination courts should, but currently do
not, treat freedom of conscience with the same deference, whether that
exercise of conscience relates to sexual orientation or to religious
orientation.100
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CONCLUSION
Essentialism has limited what gay rights advocates—including friends,
family, and other allies—can achieve. Advocates who use essentialist
theory to promote gay rights inadvertently support a static image of
sexuality in general and a victim image of gays in particular. However,
these advocates can overcome the limitations of essentialist theory if they
premise their advocacy on a more constructionist-nuanced theory that
focuses on autonomy and integrity, and if they emphasize the right to
freedom of conscience that is analogous to the notion of religious freedom.
Through this use of constructionist theory, gay rights advocates will entice
judges and lawyers into a more meaningful dialogue that will advance,
rather than simply maintain, rights recognition. While these advocates must
be aware that this new approach will not respond to all of the difficulties
inherent in the gay rights movement, and while it may even create new
dilemmas, I believe they will nevertheless find that using constructionist
theory will empower gays more as agents rather than victims, and as
conscientious actors who, in today’s society, have a right to make their own
choices regarding sexuality. This renewed sense of agency will help gay
rights advocates cultivate more meaningful rights recognition to help
protect against discrimination and violence.
Perhaps most importantly, these advocates might begin to understand
through constructionist theory that all forms of discrimination—racism,
homophobia, and religious discrimination, and others—are based on social
constructs. Perhaps through constructionist dialogue we will all begin to
learn that the perspective that matters for a rights movement is ultimately
neither gay-specific, nor African American-specific. The only perspective
that matters is the human one, in all its complexity and with all of the
possible personal choices and expressions. Thus, when constructionist
advocates revisit the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that “injustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” they will draw on a comparison
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that supports a more genuine dialogue, a better understanding, and a truer
sense of justice for all.
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Biblically-based “morality” to prohibit recognition of the rights of gays, courts do not
apply the same Biblical code to fornicators, adulterers or divorcees. Thus, if morality is a
set of principles consistently and sincerely applied, the stereotyping and prejudice courts
use to scrutinize gays are not examples of morality. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 249-52 (1977). Dworkin’s analysis of morality supports the conclusion that
while both the Thomas S. and the Niemotko cases deal with the rights of an individual to
follow his conscience, the Thomas S. majority employs essentialism and prejudice while
the Niemotko court employs constructionism and deference to freedom of conscience.
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orientation to inspire a more constructive dialogue and to help advance recognition for
gay rights, they cannot or may not wish to duplicate every aspect of the struggle for
religious freedoms. For example, gay rights advocates simply cannot demand the rights
afforded to individuals on the basis of religion because religious freedom is specially
protected under the First Amendment. Rather, they must advocate for rights either
through the Fourteenth Amendment—using the substantive due process clause or the
equal protection clause—or through a new argument that reaches beyond the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, gay rights advocates will not seek to exclude state interference,
which is key to the separation of church and state. Rather, they will seek purposeful state
interference in order to protect basic rights that the majority already enjoys. For example,
if gay rights advocates want to secure protection from employment discrimination they
must convince the state to do two things: first, recognize that homophobia exists, and
second, make the state’s courts available to provide a remedy to gays who have been
fired as a result of homophobic discrimination. Thus, when gay rights advocates adopt an
analog to religious orientation, they should emphasize the general nature of the
comparison to sexual orientation.
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